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On the Persistence of the Genealogical in Contemporary 
Theology 
 
Abstract 
There is a persistence of genealogical discourse in a certain strand of contemporary theology. 
Opting for the genealogical shapes the theological task of remembrance and engagement with 
the historical tradition in important, but also problematic ways. In this article I discuss how 
genealogical discourse was appropriated by theology, and then uncover its implicit 
assumptions and tendencies. Analysing some encounters between theological genealogies and 
various Hegelian thinkers, I draw a contrast between Nietzschean genealogy and Hegelian 
‘phenomenology’. This comparison brings to light some fundamental ways in which the 
genealogical might distort theological writing and practice. 
Word count: 10634. 
  
It is very easy to forget; even easier to remember wrongly. For theologians whose work 
involves remembering well, this fact might induce in us a combination of mourning and regret. 
Much is unintentionally lost to time, yet even more is wittingly let go in a deceitful attempt to 
cover up our tracks. The theological task must involve a keen attention to what we remember, 
how we so often run from our memories, and, importantly, the ways in which remembering 
takes place. Acts of remembrance are intertwined with their objects, and a critique of our 
practices of remembrance must involve considering the complexity of these relationships. 
In The Anatomy of Misremembering: Von Balthasar’s Response to Philosophical Modernity, 
Cyril O’Regan draws attention to the importance of remembering rightly. 1  O’Regan is 
concerned with a certain ‘misremembering’ in modern thought, such that things are not merely 
displaced and forgotten, but seriously misconstrued—deliberately or not. Engaging with and 
learning from the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar, he seeks to remember the true sense of the 
memoria Dei, and thereby to avoid the dangers such an equivocal expression may present. Here 
the act of remembering is as important as its object. If theologians are concerned with the 
memory of God, we must always be sure to distinguish the subjective and objective senses of 
this genitive, lest our memory of God becomes wholly identified with God’s own memory. 
O’Regan’s first interlocutor and object of critique in his project is G.W.F. Hegel, a thinker who 
has deeply shaped the habits and practices of theological remembrance. O’Regan recounts 
Balthasar’s ‘counter-genealogy’ to the philosophical modernity of Hegel, and suggests that 
Balthasar reminds us of things not only forgotten, but misremembered by Hegel. O’Regan 
picks up the language of genealogy and thereby opts for a specific way of remembering, which 
itself must be evaluated. If we can designate the genealogical as a distinctive practice of 
remembrance, we must turn our eyes to the context in which this approach arose and the habits 
it instils. Should we learn anything from Hegel it must be that we must always keep an eye on 
how we ourselves remember. Although it might be right to charge Hegel with misremembering, 
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we must consider very carefully our own tendencies and misremembering. For there is a 
dimension to Hegel’s philosophy which, as I will argue, O’Regan has not fully dealt with, 
perhaps because it is so at odds with important strands of contemporary academic theology. 
The presence of genealogical discourse in contemporary theology has its root in a very specific 
academic milieu, arising as part of a larger project of finding a path forward for theology in a 
postmodern context.2 This was perhaps most clearly defended and introduced as a mode of 
theological discourse in the early work of John Milbank. In Theology and Social Theory, he 
opts for genealogical discourse in order to respond to and overcome the threat to theological 
reason posed by secular and poststructuralist thought. The rhetorical dimension of this move 
was to use a ‘method’ already present in secular discourse in order to subvert those discourses 
themselves. With genealogical discourse, however, came a set of implicit assumptions about 
what it means to remember history, culture and the presence of God in the world. While 
Milbank, O’Regan, and others write ‘baptized’ genealogies, little work has been done on the 
consequences of such a form of storytelling.  
In order to discover what is at stake in this discussion, I will take a closer look at how and why 
genealogies gained a place of prominence on the academic scene, and how they built on an 
explicit rejection of modern rationality. In light of this, we can understand more accurately how 
genealogy became a fruitful mode of theological discourse and how Milbank, in particular, 
found a theological justification for such a move.  
On this basis, I suggest that we must ask questions about the genealogical approach in theology 
today. A critique of the genealogical is especially pertinent given the emergence of a new form 
of Hegelian thought, perhaps most notably in the work of Slavoj Žižek. I am not interested in 
Žižek’s work as such here, but how it constitutes a return of Hegelian thought which challenges 
and makes apparent the limitations of a genealogical approach in theology. Certain encounters 
between variations of Hegelian thought and a Christian genealogy in O’Regan’s and Milbank’s 
writings reveal some previously unrecognised problems. A form of deadlock, and even 
implausibility, in the face of Hegelian critique, points to the limits of the genealogical approach 
itself, irrespective of the specifics of the stories told. The eagerness to demonstrate what Hegel 
misremembered prevents a critical look at how a genealogical approach can skew our own 
memory. Looking at the work of Žižek will help us to see what is at stake because his is a 
Hegelianism after the failure of modern rationality. His rejection of genealogy demonstrates 
that this is not about the conflict between modern rationality and various postmodern 
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discourses, but rather about negotiating between the two major traditions of Nietzsche and 
Hegel in our contemporary intellectual situation.  
The core issue is, therefore, the difference between a Nietzschean genealogy and what I will 
call a Hegelian ‘phenomenology’. I will contend that opting for a Nietzschean genealogy 
results in genuine theological losses that distort our practice of remembrance, and hence that 
there is still something to be learned from Hegel. My assertion is not primarily that an arrival 
of a new kind of Hegelianism requires new tools with which to respond to an apologetic 
challenge. Nor is this an unequivocal defence of Hegel—such a defence would again run the 
risk of opting for one genealogical strand to the exclusion of the other. The point is rather that 
these encounters with the Hegelian tradition might remind us of some truths forgotten in 
following the postmodern tradition of purging ourselves of the Hegelian. 
A word must be added about the seemingly inconsistent nature of questioning genealogies with 
what seems to be yet another genealogy. Is not my own argument simply just a genealogy about 
how genealogies arose, and then yet another plea for something ‘lost’ on the way—in my case 
a strand of Hegelian thinking? Yes, to some extent. To this, however, I would add that part of 
my aim here to question the tendency of genealogies to portray the ‘wrong’ line of descent as 
irredeemably wrong, while valorising another line as unequivocally good. I reject this tendency 
and can, therefore, admit that there is much to be learned from a genealogical approach, not to 
say actual genealogies written by theologians the past decades. Furthermore, my argument 
transitions from a short genealogy of genealogies, to a consideration of the particularities of 
some contemporary theological exchanges. The weight of my argument rests just as much on 
this part. The following analysis of what we have lost in opting for genealogies, and what we 
can learn from a Hegelian phenomenology is written with the recognition that we are always 
inheritors of a multitude of traditions and that there is always something to learn even from 
those traditions to which we would rather not listen. Let us now begin. 
 
GENEALOGY AFTER THE FAILURE OF CRITIQUE 
Many twentieth-century thinkers read Nietzsche as the initiator and prophet of a postmodern 
culture growing out of a dissatisfaction with the Enlightenment project of critique. What I call 
‘critique’ in this context is the project of discerning truth by means of a rationality that 
transcends individual viewpoints and on the basis of which disagreement can in principle be 
negotiated and resolved. This critique required the notion of a trans- or super-linguistic and 
universal rationality. Granted, Nietzsche’s dissatisfaction with this notion of universal reason 
had predecessors, as seen for example in Johann Georg Hamann’s metacritique of Kant’s 
critical philosophy, or Frederich Heinrich Jacobi’s charge that modern reason leads to 
‘nihilism’ in his Briefe über die Lehre Spinozas.3 Common to these attacks is the claim that a 
trans-linguistic and stable rationality is little more than a myth, and that the whole project of 
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modern critique fails the moment one sees the linguistic, cultural and contingent nature of 
modern reason.  
For Nietzsche, this dissatisfaction with modern critique results in a novel rhetoric, which, 
although not omnipresent in his works, points to a new kind of discourse after Enlightenment 
rationality. Most famously in the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche relativizes ethical rationality 
when he tells the story of morality otherwise.4 But this new form of storytelling is not the story 
of a Phenomenology of Spirit which vindicates rationality by showing how it envelopes its 
historical failures within itself and thus transcends culture and language precisely by working 
in and through it, nor it is another narrative legitimization of knowledge in the terms of Jean-
François Lyotard. With the Genealogy of Morals, we see the origins of a form of storytelling 
that challenges any legitimization of knowledge as such. 
In ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Foucault—an important genealogist himself—argued that in late 
modernity, one is faced with the task of constructing a ‘historical ontology’ as a ‘critique of 
what we are saying and doing’.5 This critique is a critique of limits, and thus a critique of 
critique, in so far as judging (krisis) always happens on the basis of a stable law or rule that 
provides limits for judgement. Instead of tracing the limits of knowledge, as in Kant’s case, 
now we must ask ‘in what is given to us as universal, obligatory, what place is occupied by 
whatever is singular, contingent and the product of arbitrary constraint?’ We are thus taken 
from a delineation of what cannot be transgressed, to the opposite task of discovering what can 
be transgressed. This shift also constitutes a turn from a transcendental investigation of the 
supra-historical structures of reason to one of history: now the task is to show that the ways in 
which we think, speak and live are not universally necessary; that they are products of 
contingent and arbitrary historical changes.6  A narrative legitimation of the universal and 
eternal truths of reason is turned on its head and becomes a genealogical destabilisation of those 
very truths. It is in this sense that genealogy becomes the central philosophical ‘design’. 
Contingency is the focal point for the genealogical approach; for it is explicitly set in contrast 
to any developmental or evolutionary approach. In his ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ 
Foucault traces the important (though sometimes conflated) distinction between Herkunft and 
Ursprung in Nietzsche’s work: A genealogy should not trace the Ursprung or the origin of a 
way of living or thinking. The notion of an origin implies the fixed essence of something that 
has appeared, but that is precisely what the genealogical approach rules out.7 A genealogical 
critique cannot be reduced to an attempt to locate the precise origin of an idea, whether to 
establish or discredit that idea. Instead, genealogies trace Herkunft, the descent of an idea, 
tradition, group or way of living, showing how there are no stable essences or origins to be 
found. Unlike a story that valorises a certain concept, object or a person by tracing its heritage, 
Nietzsche’s genealogy does quite the opposite: showing how the elements of the world we 
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Introduction to Foucault’s Thought (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 45. 
6 Ibid., 46. 
7  Michel Foucault and Paul Rabinow, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault 
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inhabit stem from not just one origin, but a constant conjunction of origins or forces.8 In the 
Nietzschean tradition, the genealogical exhibits how the various forms of life and thinking are 
expressions of will(s) to power. Now the task is to trace the coming to be and passing away of 
things so that how we live, speak and think is gradually seen for what it is: radically contingent. 
The genealogical form and Foucault’s distinctive ‘discourse analysis’ appeared in an academic 
landscape dominated by ahistorical analysis. Sociological analysis and Marxist ideological 
critique relied on distinctions between historical articulations and ahistorical substrata from 
which to launch the critique. When Foucault effectively replaced terms such as ‘ideology’ and 
‘culture’ with ‘discourse’ it was a part of his project of historicizing analysis and demonstrating 
the possibility of transgressing the constraint of ahistorical foundations, whether they were a 
priori transcendental conditions, the immanent movement of dialectics or the analysis of base 
and superstructure. Yet because he was able to attend to that which tried to escape 
symbolisation and destabilisation by tracing the historical rootedness of the ‘a priori’ and 
alterations of episteme, his discourse analysis accounted for much of what was valuable in 
ideology critique without recourse to synchronic explanations and access to non-symbolised 
and ahistorical realms. 
The significant trade-off, however, was to ‘horizontalize’ critique, indeed, to convert critique 
into analysis. Discourse analysis and genealogy with it are horizontal because it does not 
distinguish between a realm of ‘ideology’ or a symbolic and discursive domain, on the one 
hand, and a non-ideological domain on the other—a distinction which, as mentioned, seems to 
be the condition of possibility for any critique. To put it differently: there is nothing ‘beneath’ 
or ‘beyond’ discourse, such that even a genealogical ‘critique’ is really just a way of showing 
how every discourse which claims its ahistorical grounding in a stable substrate—including the 
genealogy itself!—relies on another set of linguistic configurations that is historically situated 
and therefore radically contingent. The result, then, is a radically immanentist and pluralist 
conception: there is nothing beyond the multitude of stories, symbols and culturally and bodily 
conditioned practices. Discourse analysis therefore also rejected the notion of ideology because 
in one sense everything became ideological, and yet, if there is a corresponding notion of 
ideology in discourse analysis, it must be defined as those discourses that claim for themselves 
privileged access to a non- or extra-discursive realm. This is the point at which the genealogical 
design kicks in and shows how the supposedly non-ideological realm is already the result of 
various textual or discursive devices. 
 
THEOLOGY AND GENEALOGY 
This is the background against which we need to understand the appropriation of genealogical 
critique in theological discourse, as is evident in Milbank’s explicit dialogue with and criticism 
of postmodern thought in Theology and Social Theory. After a long crescendo, wherein he 
critically out-narrates political liberalism, positivism, and dialectics, the argument finally 
becomes self-reflective. Under the chapter title ‘Ontological Violence or the Postmodern 
Problematic’—a chapter grouped together in the same section (‘Theology and Difference’) as 
his own proposal—, Milbank begins discussing ‘method’, for it is through and in the 
postmodern problematic that Milbank discovers a way of establishing a theological discourse. 
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Approaching the postmodern, treated as a single philosophy, Milbank dissects it into two 
aspects: 
On the one hand, a historicist ‘genealogy’, on the other hand an ‘ontology of 
difference’, the two being interconnected in a fashion somewhat analogous to the 
relation between Hegel’s Phenomenology and Hegel’s Logic.’9  
Leaving aside the intriguing, yet contentious analogy with Hegel for now, we note that this 
two-aspect interpretation of postmodern philosophy becomes a minimal standard for how a 
post-Nietzschean philosophy or theology ought to proceed.  
However, Milbank points out the insufficiency of a purely historicist genealogy: even in 
Nietzsche there is a strong evaluative aspect. Why should the whole of history, or every event 
be understood as ‘an event of war?’, Milbank asks. The answer is that Nietzsche has 
‘transcendentally understood all differences as negatively related’.10 The historicist narrative is 
therefore supplied with an ontology of violence, hidden under the apparent neutrality of 
genealogy. This veiling of a deeper mythos driving the evaluations of the narrative is necessary 
to distract us from the vacuous nature of any claim on the part of the postmoderns that their 
genealogy is binding. 
Here is really the opening gambit of Milbank’s play: if the postmodern problematic can be 
reduced to a historicist genealogy of violence founded in a mythos of ontological violent 
difference, there is nothing stopping him from telling a different story on the basis of an 
‘ontology of peace’, since the notion of a universally binding rationality is by definition ruled 
out of the game. To the Genealogy of Morals, Milbank now proposes a new City of God. To 
the ‘logic’ of postmodern difference based on a univocity of being, he opposes a metaphysic 
of analogical difference.  
Milbank’s appropriation of genealogical discourse is, therefore, an attempt to join forces with 
the postmodern attack on modern liberal reason, while simultaneously out-flanking 
postmodern philosophers by challenging them on their own turf. Notably, rational 
argumentation is turned into an act of rhetorical performance, for there is no universal rational 
basis on which the Christian mythos can be shown to be a true one. At the same time, this is no 
collapse to relativism because the persuasiveness of the rhetorical performance is theologically 
grounded in the desire of creatures for God, and thus the Christian genealogical account is 
ultimately a story that attracts by virtue of its own beauty. It is roughly this understanding, I 
suggest, that must ground an appropriation of the genealogical for theology.11 
However, whilst there is no clear sign of the decline of the Foucauldian tradition, which lives 
on in a variety of contemporary thinkers, as we shall see, the rise of a new form of Hegelian 
                                                
9 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed (Oxford, UK ; 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2006), 278. 
10 Ibid., 290. 
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directions in Milbank’s greater oeuvre that at times upsets this primacy of the genealogical 
narrative signalled in Theology and Social Theory. My readings of Milbank must therefore be 
taken in the context of my attempt to bring out the specific tendencies of the genealogical. A 
fuller appreciation of Milbank’s works is likely to complicate my reading in important ways. 
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philosophy, most notably in the work of Slavoj Žižek, causes issues for a ‘method’ so clearly 
shaped as a response to a Nietzschean and postmodern context.12 
 
THE LIMITS OF GENEALOGY 
In The Anatomy of Misremembering, the first volume of his project of creatively tracing 
Balthasar’s philosophical response to modernity, Cyril O’Regan aligns himself with the work 
of David Bentley Hart and shows appreciation for Milbank’s genealogical approach. 13 His 
project, therefore, proceeds with a similar genealogical approach to that of Milbank, but this 
time applying it in a sustained critique of Hegelian thought. According to O’Regan, Balthasar 
‘enters the Hegelian sanctuary, tells the story otherwise, and by doing so achieves a result 
considerably more hospitable to Christianity.’14  
Why this approach? Genealogy, O’Regan claims, is ‘almost coincident with the Western 
tradition of discourse,’ and therefore so pervasive that the philosopher or theologian cannot 
avoid it. Here the Phenomenology is listed as Hegel’s most explicit genealogy, a text which is 
later ‘genealogically outnarrated’ by postmodern philosophers such as Nietzsche, Derrida, and 
Lyotard.15 O’Regan takes genealogy for granted as a form of theological discourse, indubitably 
because he is already inspired by his theological contemporaries. But in a perplexing turn of 
phrase, he baptises it a ‘particular kind of supporting argument’, a discourse the theologian 
turns to in support of his ‘procedural’, and substantive arguments. Genealogy functions, he 
says, by tracing the origins of the forms of practice, discourses, and ideas that the genealogist 
seeks to defend or subvert.  
This interpretation of genealogical discourse is not entirely accurate, and it also fails to address 
a series of methodological questions such an interpretation raises. If the genealogy is accorded 
secondary status, merely supporting a primary procedural argument, then one must ask what 
force such a story carries. A more primary form of procedural rationality would suggest a 
rational dialectic in light of which the genealogy would pale, with the risk of it being brushed 
away as a somewhat pretentious performance in the history of ideas. How does it not become 
mere posturing? Furthermore, if a more primary form of reasoning is admitted, must not this 
procedural rationality face the same genealogical torment of the postmoderns? Is it not the very 
function of such a genealogy to subvert ‘procedural’ rationality?  
Besides the complexities facing O’Regan when he grants genealogy a secondary role and 
thereby executes a wholly different project from that of Nietzsche and Foucault on the one 
hand, and Milbank and Hart on the other, his project could also benefit from a closer analysis 
of the relation between Hegel and a genealogical critique. Granted that we understand the role 
of genealogy broadly in the sense defended by Milbank, and not in the subordinate sense 
O’Regan defends, has not O’Regan still bypassed the real challenge of Hegel? If one can 
overcome Hegel simply by ‘telling the story otherwise’, that is, by remembering something 
Hegel has forgotten, then Hegel has already been defeated. The competition of genealogies 
                                                
12 I am aware of the problems of using the word ’method’ in this context. For, as we shall see 
presently, a theological appropriation of genealogy fails if it is treated as mere ’method’. 
13 O’Regan, The Anatomy of Misremembering, 22–23. 
14 Ibid., 53. 
15 Ibid., 50. 
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assumes the impossibility of Hegelian critique, and by so staging the encounter between 
Balthasar and Hegel, he ensures Hegel’s loss from the start.  
Hegel would be the first to claim that his story of the Western world, whether in his 
Phenomenology of Spirit or other works, read genealogically in O’Regan’s sense, carries no 
weight at all. Consequently, a Balthasarian counter-genealogy provides little argumentative 
force because it has no original genealogy to oppose. Instead, O’Regan has already rendered 
Hegel mute by transposing the argument into a genealogical mode. This discursive approach 
to Hegel was already present in his magisterial The Heterodox Hegel, and is a common feature 
of how O’Regan analyses historical works.16 The result is that, on the one hand, the job is 
already done when he stages the dispute as one of competing genealogies since genealogy 
properly understood is built on the Nietzschean critique of the modern project. On the other 
hand, since O’Regan does not face the possibility of genealogical critique becoming vacuous 
unless the primacy of genealogy over substantial rationality is assumed, nothing is done at all: 
the Hegelian can simply wait for him to finish this ‘supporting argument’, and then ask for him 
to present his ‘procedural’ and primary arguments in the realm of dialectics. O’Regan never 
asks whether this move away from dialectics and Enlightenment reason to a genealogical 
historicism and a primacy of mythos is legitimate. Although his book is impressive and helpful 
in all sorts of ways, these methodological issues must be addressed, lest the project whole 
should be reduced to a reconstruction of various pieces of a genealogical puzzle from 
Balthasar’s work.  
We similarly see the dilemma facing a genealogical approach in a very interesting exchange 
between Milbank and Žižek. Although the debate, which takes place in The Monstrosity of 
Christ, deserves closer attention than what I can give it here, we find a perfect example of how 
a contemporary Hegelianism can claim to find a path beyond the apparent deadlock of opposing 
genealogies.17 After an essay from each of the interlocutors, in which they debate everything 
from the true nature of Christianity to dialectics versus analogy and the place of Meister 
Eckhart in the history of ideas, Žižek reflects on how to go forward: 
It may appear that, in a theoretical debate, one reaches a dead end when the two 
opponents are reduced to their basic presuppositions—at this point, every 
argumentation, inclusive of “immanent critique,” is superfluous; each of the two is 
reduced to his/her “here I stand,” about which the other cannot do anything without 
relying on his/her own ultimate presuppositions, on his/her own “here I stand.” 
However, a truly Hegelian approach does allow for an option here, the one of denying 
the obvious, of claiming: “You say this is your position, but it is not true—you do not 
have a position at all!” That is to say, one denies that it is possible at all to truly advocate 
the opponent’s position—something that resembles the immortal answer of the 
interrogator to Winston Smith’s query “Does Big Brother really exist?” from 1984: “It 
is YOU who doesn’t exist!”18 
Žižek’s refusal to remain with this deadlock closely corresponds to his criticism of Milbank’s 
polemic: ‘the gap that separates us is most clearly discernible in the opposite cases: when 
                                                
16 Cyril O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel, SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994). 
17 Slavoj Žižek, John Milbank, and Creston Davis, eds., The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or 
Dialectic?, Short Circuits (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009). 
18 Ibid., 235. 
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Milbank criticises me simply for what I claim, as if my position is self-evidently untenable.’19 
As both of them see, this is precisely the gap between a genealogical approach and a left-wing 
Hegelian critique: If there is no accessible surplus to discourse—that is, no extra-linguistic 
position from which to critique competing claims—the possibility of a deadlock on ‘rational’ 
grounds is real, and in that case, the interlocutors may have to be content with denouncing each 
other’s narratives. It is here, however, that Žižek sees a path forward, to which we will turn in 
a moment. 
O’Regan, incidentally, reviewed the Žižek–Milbank exchange. In an insightful analysis, 
referring to the interpretative dispute about Meister Eckhart which played a big part of the 
exchange, he asks ‘what happens should Žižek offer the more persuasive reading of Eckhart?’20 
The question is perhaps more pertinent than O’Regan himself realises, if my criticisms of him 
are correct. His point is that for Milbank the narrative emplotment of Eckhart in Milbank’s 
story of Christianity is more than a historical dispute—it is a part of the very rhetorical force 
his argument, which happens to be the only kind of ‘force’ that Milbank ultimately can admit. 
Nevertheless, O’Regan’s analysis of the potential yield of Milbank’s strategy is not as 
convincing. While O’Regan thinks the upshot of a successful outcome of Milbank’s 
performance is ‘to upset Žižek’s Protestant metanarrative of Orthodoxy-Catholicism-
Protestantism at its strongest point and make him incur something like a defeat’,21 I suggest 
Žižek’s reading of Christianity was never a ‘metanarrative’ in the first place: it was a 
phenomenological subversion of Milbank’s orthodox narrative. 
 
HEGELIANISM AFTER THE END OF CRITIQUE 
I take an interest in Žižek because his represents a Hegelianism after the end of Enlightenment 
rationality. At the same time, his project signals a discontentment with the Twentieth-century 
turn to the linguistic and its total rejection of critique.22 While he is a Marxist or left-wing 
Hegelian in some sense, his Hegelianism takes quite a different shape from the Hegelian 
modernity which came under attack from postmodern thought.  I am not so much interested in 
the details of Žižek’s project as tracing what exactly he is affirming that those in the 
Nietzschean tradition deny, a difference which now cannot be reduced to the question of 
universal reason.  
Žižek does not challenge the Foucauldian claim about the universality of discourse, nor does 
he postulate a non-linguistic or non-ideological domain from which one can adjudicate between 
positions. Still, contrary to the Nietzschean tradition he does think there is a peculiar moment 
of excess to discourse (or the ‘Symbolic’), which allows him to postulate a new form of 
critique. Here Žižek combines Hegel and Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to postulate this 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Cyril O’Regan, “Zizek and Milbank and the Hegelian Death of God,” Modern Theology 30, 
no. 4 (2010): 285. 
21 Ibid. 
22 I grant that the Foucaldian, anti-Hegelian legacy is very much alive. One example is the work 
of Giorgio Agamben. Here the discontentment with not being able to transgress the realm of 
discourse is tackled head on, by reformulating the problem of the ineffable and unsayable 
’beyond’ of language to a task immanent to discourse itself (defined as the problem of the 
’infancy’ of language). Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of 
Experience (London ; New York: Verso, 1993). 
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moment of excess without claiming that this transgression of the immanent discursive realm 
puts us in touch with a substantive and non-ideological reality. Instead, there lies in every 
moment of thinking a possibility of the appearance of the Lacanian ‘Real’, a moment when the 
linguistic configuration in question shows itself as appearance. The Real, as the moment where 
the symbolic realm is transgressed, is just this moment of appearance as appearance: 
Therein resides Plato’s deep insight: Ideas are not the hidden reality beneath 
appearances … Ideas are nothing but the very form as such—or, as Lacan succinctly 
rendered Plato’s point, the supra-sensible is appearance as appearance.23 
Every symbolic construct can possibly reveal itself as appearance, as a construct that is veiling 
something. In a turn of phrase that could have been taken from some work of Christian 
theology, Žižek claims that “reality is never directly ‘itself’”.24 This requires a kind of tension 
or break which creates the possibility of the reflexive ‘as’ of appearance as appearance. There 
must be something against which the Symbolic can be understood as appearing, or more 
precisely as veiling something behind its appearing. While no non-ideological or non-
discursive domain exists, and so no hard reality in light of which the symbolic construct can 
show itself as appearance, nonetheless, for any such construct there arises a crack, 
inconsistency or incompleteness where it reveals itself as ideology.  
This is the moment when the Real shows itself, but the Real is just this incompleteness of the 
Symbolic. The Real is empty or nowhere, it is not a positive place from which one can judge 
what is true. The Real is the ‘irrepresentable X’ as such—the non-symbolized remainder of 
every construct which provides us with ‘a place that enables us to maintain a distance’ from 
ideology and so affirm that it ‘is not all.’25 Žižek therefore affirms just enough distance from 
the discursive to judge ideology as ideology, without staking out another position or 
perspective. Within the ideologically constructed realm, therefore, there are always 
possibilities for failure—a glitch in the Matrix—if you like, where the constructed, immanent 
world betrays its inability to cover up a crack at the heart of being. 
In light of this brief outline, we can see how this almost inverted Hegelianism differs from both 
old Marxist ideology critique and Foucauldian genealogy critique: according to this account, 
the old left-wing ideology critique failed because it confused the effective nature of appearance 
as such with the notion of a truth behind appearance, that is, with a subterranean materialist 
reality.26 Žižek couples a radical denial of the non-ideological with a strong theory of how 
ideologies still function just in virtue of being appearances. On the other hand, discourse 
analysis failed because it refused to imagine a different ‘externality’ from that proposed by 
Enlightenment reason. Having historicized every rational a priori, the universality of discourse 
seemed to rule out critique, properly understood. This new Hegelianism, however, is based on 
the claim that there might still be a place for critique if one returns to an ontology of radical 
brokenness.  
                                                
23  Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism 
(London ; New York: Verso, 2012), 31. 
24 Slavoj Žižek, “The Spectre of Ideology,” in Mapping Ideology, ed. Slavoj Žižek, Mapping 
(London ; New York: Verso, 1994), 21. 
25 Ibid., 17. 
26 Fabio Vighi and Heiko Feldner, “Ideology Critique or Discourse Analysis? Žižek against 
Foucault,” European Journal of Political Theory 6, no. 2 (2007): 147. 
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The crucial difference between the Hegelian tradition and the tradition from which the 
genealogical approach arose, then, is that the former affirms the possibility of maintaining 
some form of distance to the immanent discursive realm which it can be considered as such, 
and therefore a moment in which something might be learned. I want to stress again, however, 
that this return of Hegelian critique is by no means the return to a notion of universal reason as 
if dialectical reason has suddenly achieved its own self-legitimisation—although this hope of 
course lingers on in the right wing liberal interpretations of Hegel. Hence the Nietzschean 
tradition is to some extent given its due, something which finds its clearest expression in 
Žižek’s acknowledging the universal nature of ideology and the emptiness and indeterminacy 
of the non-ideological space.  
As a result, the possibility of critique is, as all post-Enlightenment philosophy, based on a 
wager. At this point might we not ask whether we are simply back to historicism? Any attempt 
on the part of the Hegelian to legitimise the possibility could surely be contested by 
historicizing the ‘transcendentals’ on which the legitimisation rests? Yes, that is strictly 
speaking true. But that does not force the Hegelian to adopt discourse analysis and genealogical 
historicism since there is no position from which to judge the post-rational Lacanian-Hegelian 
project less adequate than historicism. This wager, which any post-Nietzschean philosophy 
must admit lest it should return to the Enlightenment project, is clearly admitted by Žižek in 
his response to Gérad Lebrun’s Nietzschean critique of Hegel. Lebrun tries to overcome 
Hegelianism through a Foucauldian and non-ontological reading of Nietzsche, on which basis 
he can claim that already with Hegel’s dialectic a series of ‘semantic decisions’ have been 
taken.27 Žižek’s riposte is not to deny that there is no radically contingent semantic decision 
before dialectics but rather that the whole point of Hegel’s philosophy is to show what happens 
when we make these fundamental semantic decisions: 
If there is a “semantic choice” that underlies Hegel’s thought, it is not the desperate 
wager that, retroactively, one will be able to tell a consistent, all-encompassing and 
meaningful story in which every detail will be allotted to its proper place, but, on the 
contrary, the weird certainty … that, with every figure of consciousness or form of life, 
things will always somehow “go wrong,” that each position will generate an excess 
which will augur its self-destruction.28 
This ‘weird certainty’ puts a wedge between the liberal reading of Hegel that still believes in 
universal reason and the one of Žižek’s since the possibility of a Hegelian philosophy after 
Nietzsche cannot be established on purely rational grounds. Nevertheless, what the Hegelian 
can do, and what Žižek does, is to provide a counter-reading of history which is not a 
genealogy, but a Hegelian phenomenology.29  This reading, although it might not convince the 
historicist, would at the very least demonstrate that the Hegelian has her own way of accounting 
for history, which is not a simple tracing of the Herkunft of any particular concept or way of 
life. 
 
                                                
27 Žižek, Less than Nothing, 195. 
28 Ibid., 207. 
29 A somewhat superfluous clarification: I do not primarily refer to the ‘phenomenological’ 
tradition of Husserl, Heidegger and others with this term. I intend to designate a project 
analogous to that of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. 
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HEGELIAN PHENOMENOLOGY 
If the genealogical approach arose as a critique of limits and an attempt to demonstrate the 
immanence and all-pervasiveness of discourse, the primary goal of a phenomenology is to 
persuade the reader that there is a way of acting, being and thinking that entails a dimension 
that cannot be reduced to the finite moments of the discursive plane itself, and further that this 
moment or distance is just what we need if we are to learn something. This distance, in other 
words, is what allows us to obtain a new perspective. Whether this suggests an encompassing 
reason working through and holding together the finite particularities of reality or, as in the 
Žižekian reading, a brutal crack at the heart of being and the necessity and universality of 
ideology, a Hegelian phenomenology is an invitation to an act of remembrance, Erinnerung, 
of such movements of excess to discourse. 
On this understanding, there is still room for a post-Enlightenment Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Such a phenomenology will lead the reader through a series of symbolic ‘moments’ or 
constructs—ideal and historical—and show how, at the moment when the incompleteness of 
these constructs becomes explicit, one partakes in a movement of thought which is de facto a 
transgression of the discursive. Like a genealogy, the success or failure of this kind of 
phenomenology is not based on the soundness of a deductive argument. Instead, the success 
depends on whether one can lead the reader through these same movements and convince her 
that she has partaken in a process which cannot be reduced to the immanence of the discursive. 
It is crucial to note that this moment of excess is a moment of learning: it is not visible on the 
discursive level for the very reason that what is being learned is a new configuration of the 
world, of the possibilities revealed in the dynamic process Hegel calls ‘Spirit’.  
Hegel unpacks in abstract form this general approach of phenomenology in the introduction to 
the Phenomenology of Spirit. Here he discusses the blindness of the ordinary consciousness, 
the consciousness that only remains with finite particularities, or, in our terms, within the 
immanence of discourse. In order to go beyond ordinary consciousness and reach Science, one 
must gain a proper understanding of the relation between cognition and truth, between subject 
and object. Here one can be caught up with the classical epistemological task of inspecting 
one’s instruments of knowledge to ensure that they give access to truth. Yet Hegel subverts 
this problematic of subject and object, and shows a way forward: At first (ordinary) 
consciousness cognises an object and takes this object to be the in-itself, or the essence, which 
is the True. This is the conception of truth which is the root of the epistemological dilemma: if 
truth is the object in-itself, then we soon entangle ourselves in quibbles about the proper 
instruments, or mediations, to reach the truth therein. 
But then another cognition appears: ‘the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself.’ 30  This 
second cognition will at first be taken precisely as secondary and nothing but ‘the reflection of 
consciousness into itself … i.e. what consciousness has in mind is not an object, but only its 
knowledge of that first object.’ On this understanding, the second cognition amounts to a 
superfluous ‘I know that I know’.  Nevertheless, with the appearance of this second cognition, 
something has happened to the object first cognised. The object 
                                                
30 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Claredon Press, 
1979), 55 (§86). 
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ceases to be the in-itself, and becomes something that is the in-itself only for 
consciousness. And this then is the True: the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself. 
Or, in other words, this is the essence, or the object of consciousness.31 
This transition from the cognition of ordinary consciousness to a new form of cognition is 
radical, the complete transformation of the notion of truth, object and essence: a transformation 
which pulls us straight into the heart of Hegel’s conception of Science. Our interest, for now, 
is in Hegel’s comment on this transition between the first and second cognition. The incursion 
of reflexivity (‘I know that I know’), which first appeared as a trivial recursive cognition of 
one’s own knowledge, actually completely alters the object itself and veils its own doings in 
the process: 
But it is just this necessity itself, or the origination of the new object, that presents itself 
to consciousness without its understanding how this happens, which proceeds for us, as 
it were, behind the back of consciousness.32 
This process, which happens ‘behind the back’ of consciousness, or beyond the discursive, first 
seems trivial to those locked into the immanence of the discursive, finite domain. Ordinary 
reason cannot see the radical change because it is wedded to the first cognition, and does not 
understand the fundamental transformation of the second. It is this problem of drawing 
attention to the fundamental change at the margins of the text, the invisible transgression which 
happens in the labour of thought, which calls for a book such as the Phenomenology. Behind 
our backs, under the surface of the text, the object changes so that the truth of the object is not 
something in-itself behind appearance, but rather a context in which the knower and the object 
are entangled, and where the knower is to realize that the truth has to do with how the object 
appears to her. In this is implied that the ‘depth’ of reality which so often is sought after behind 
the object—the Platonic Idea, if you like—is actually the depth or context in which the object 
and consciousness themselves reside. The change in the object is intimately connected to the 
performance of thinking: this speculative change happens as a result of the labour of thought, 
although, from the perspective of ordinary consciousness, this change comes as an added 
surplus to its investment in this act. This is where learning takes place, which involves a 
reconsideration of what counts as an object, what counts as a standard, and what counts as 
counting.  
A phenomenology tries to convince the reader of a process of learning, or a transition in thought 
where something happens beyond the discursive (the reconstitution of the object, or the 
appearing of the non-symbolic) which is the condition of possibility of the change which 
happens on the discursive plane. The phenomenological of the Phenomenology is therefore not 
just a keen attention to and immersion to the discursive object, but also consists of a doubling 
of the phenomenological—a second attentiveness to the shift in context or, in other words, 
what goes on all around the discursive. But it is only the first, finite attentiveness which can be 
provided and performed by Hegel as the author. Hegel has no way of forcing the reader to see 
that the importance of second, reflexive cognition of the object in its relation to consciousness. 
The second phenomenological or attentive level, should the Phenomenology succeed, must be 
supplied by the reader itself. It is the wager of the phenomenological journey that the reader 
takes the new cognition of the ‘being for consciousness of the in-itself’ as a qualitative change 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 56 (§86). 
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in the object itself, and not just an incursion of reflexivity of little importance. That is why the 
Phenomenology is a work of Bildung: 
The series of configurations which consciousness goes through along this road is, in 
reality, the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of 
Science.33 
The Phenomenology provides an ’itinerary of the soul’, (‘Itinerarium Mentis in Deum’) which 
the reader is called on to follow.34 Throughout the journey, the reader is invited to partake in a 
series of transitions or moves, and along the way Hegel tries to draw attention to the 
imperceptible shifts in context that adds another dimension not reducible to the discursive 
plane. This is remembrance as Bildung.   
Žižek often presents short or extended versions of this Hegelian phenomenology, although with 
his devilish twist. His writings are filled with excessive digressions, obscene jokes and ironical 
inversions as he analyses and critiques ideological constructs. This style, however, cannot 
simply be reduced to a particular rhetorical choice, but must be read as his own call to 
remember the inauthenticity of every rational construal of the world. While it has been pointed 
out that Žižek at times betrays his Hegelianism by reducing cultural analysis to a series of 
exemplifications of his abstract universal, even if this universal is one of Hegelian-Lacanian 
philosophy, the pedagogical and habitual aspects of these digressions are more important than 
their illustrative function.35 The joke that relativizes and embarrasses a peculiar verity of the 
defenders of liberal democracy, for example, is not a secondary rhetorical gloss over a more 
substantive procedural argument. If one removed the jokes and digressions from Žižek’s 
corpus, not much would remain. Instead, the joke is a form of training of the soul to recognise 
how eventually ideology will show itself as such. Ironic distance is the most serious 
commitment and becomes the seed of the revolutionary and political act because the ironic 
distance is the very gap ideologies seek to conceal.  
This might explain why Milbank’s genealogical approach in his debate with Žižek in The 
Monstrosity of Christ at times seems to miss the point. The force of Žižek’s writing is not his 
contrived story of the three stages of Christianity (Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant), nor his 
claim that Meister Eckhart is on his side—a point which seems more important to Milbank 
than Žižek, but the phenomenological training of the reader induced through his excessive 
rhetoric and subversion of Christianity. Perhaps Milbank even recognises this when he turns to 
an extended ‘phenomenological’ description of how Christianity seems more true to the reality 
we encounter.36 Such a response is only partially adequate, however. It seems to me that the 
strongest critique of Žižek in particular must go beyond a simple counter-learning of another 
picture or way of imagining. It must show that Žižek has given up education entirely: for while 
Hegel always knew that the radical contingency that disrupts every present is an opportunity 
for learning, Žižek’s phenomenology is content with teaching the necessity of the contingency 
itself. This is the source of the abstract nature of his writings—there is nothing new to be 
learned, only that everything will eventually fail. As such, the latter’s ideology critique 
                                                
33 Ibid., 50 (§78). 
34  Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1974), 11. 
35 Pace Simon Jarvis, “Review of the Parallax View,” The Liberal, accessed October 23, 2015, 
http://www.theliberal.co.uk/issue_9/reviews/nf_jarvis_9.html. 
36 Žižek, Milbank, and Davis, The Monstrosity of Christ, 160ff. 
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sometimes borders on the banal. In contrast, for Hegel contingency is the opportunity for 
learning at least something and so for changing the way we inhabit a changing world.  
 
GENEALOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 
These are the contours of genealogy and phenomenology, and we have here uncovered some 
of the dynamics and tensions in certain contemporary encounters between a theological-
genealogical approach and Hegelian thought. As I unpack some of the differences between the 
genealogical and the phenomenological, my intention is not to say that many of those 
theologians who write genealogies do not strive to conceive of theology in similar ways to the 
virtues of the phenomenological. Instead, the point is exactly this: there is a tension between 
the genealogical form of theological writing and the desired conception of theology, which 
sometimes leads to problematic distortions of the theological practice itself. 
Here is the first difference we must draw attention to: Unlike the secular genealogies of a 
Foucault or an Agamben, a properly theological approach will, like Milbank argued, defend 
the idea that there is a truth which surpasses the immanence of finite discourse. Indeed, the 
very project of the theological appropriation of genealogy was to tell a different story; a story 
which affirmed the presence of transcendence, while affirming the all-pervasiveness of 
language and the radical historicism of the genealogical. These genealogies tell of moments of 
grace in history and are attempts to persuade others that these are manifestations of truth. The 
persuasiveness of this story, however, is dependent on the attractiveness of the story as a whole. 
It is only the beauty of the narrative which can arouse a desire for something that transcends 
the finite, a story which reaches at heart to a desire for God. The theological genealogist draws 
attention to an object long forgotten, trusting that this object is already witnessed to in the most 
interior depths of the reader. In this sense, the approach connects to a long-standing Christian 
tradition, which trusts that God has already planted knowledge of Himself in all people (Rom 
1:20), and which enables daring rhetorical performances such as Augustine’s City of God or 
Paul’s speech at the Areopagus. 
But there is a significant truth lost in this approach, which still lingers in Hegel’s 
phenomenology. In a phenomenology, subject and object are intertwined, and the moments of 
excess to the finite are reflected in the very approach or ‘story’ itself. The wager of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit is not whether the reader, once having reached the final chapters about 
Absolute Knowledge, is persuaded by the whole story. The real bet is on the very first page: 
for the remembrance of the movements of the Spirit in history induced throughout the 
Phenomenology is inseparable from the reader’s involvement with the text. The aim is not 
merely to tell a story of grace which has happened, which has been achieved, but to show that 
one can only remember by being drawn into the same Spirit to which Hegel draws attention. 
Remembering happens in the middle voice, somewhere between activity and passivity.37 As 
already mentioned, a phenomenology deals with a story of learning: it is an educative story 
about how we have been educated. In this way the phenomenological, as a form of 
manuductio—leading the reader by the hand—is in one sense more in line with certain 
Christian traditions than the genealogical, in so far as a properly theological writing is always 
an invitation to a journey of dispossesive remembrance as a form of education and, inversely, 
                                                
37 Pickstock, After Writing, 35. 
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education as a form of remembrance.38 Here is a progression towards the remembered, an act 
in which something might be learned.  
A historicist genealogy might avoid the developmental theodicy of which Hegelian philosophy 
is often accused,39 At the same time, such an approach involves a separation between the 
historicist narrative and the ahistorical vision of the world defended which, however much the 
abstract and heuristic nature of this separation is emphasized, threatens to skew our conception 
of remembering. An early critique of Theology and Social Theory, especially coming from 
Gillian Rose, was that it amounted to a defence of an ahistorical ‘holy middle’ only tangentially 
in contact with the difficult negotiations of reality.40 While Rose might have implied a full 
return to the dialectical with such a critique, this must not obscure the equally important insight 
that truth is not something achieved or final which can be retold in a simple sense. When truth 
can be witnessed to and remembered on a comfortably safe basis it ceases to be truth. In Rose’s 
terms, learning is a work, it is about the next step to be made, and so truth can only be 
remembered if the one who remembers herself partakes in the same spirit of education that 
once moved the saints. There must be other means of persuasion than the mere attractiveness 
of the story as a whole. Here one must indeed challenge the dichotomy of ontological vision 
and historicist genealogy: there is a sense of the entanglement of the ontological and historical 
not captured by the genealogical. Instead, the story told must be a story about the particularities 
of how we learned and continue to learn the possibilities of thinking and being in the light of 
the Gospel. 
There are good reasons why O’Regan seeks resources in Balthasar to remember what Hegel 
has forgotten. Perhaps there is, as he notes, a misremembering in Hegel’s work and an 
equivocation in his understanding of the memoria Dei. Even so, we must not forget what Hegel 
remembered: that every act of remembering involves a dispossession which is uncertain in its 
very nature. Remembering is a difficult process of contemplation and re-enactment—it is the 
essence of the liturgical as a repetition which cannot happen except by an active participation. 
The task of the theologian, then, is to remember and to invite others to a form of remembrance 
more involving than hasty genealogies. The theologian is a doctor (‘teacher’), and cannot teach 
but through manuductio or discipleship. Involved in this is perhaps a shift from a focus on the 
historical fluctuation of intellectual ideas to a mode of theological discourse which draws 
attention to what happens ‘behind our backs’. It will include something like the inversion of 
Žižek’s jokes, training the imagination of the reader to think otherwise, and thereby showing 
that learning is still possible. If writing is an adequate vehicle for the theological task of 
remembrance, that must be because reading can become an event of educative transformation.  
This also means coming to terms with the sometimes ambiguous nature of genealogies: if the 
theological task is to tell a story of an ‘other City’, is this best done by recounting a story of 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ opinions? Would this exhaust what we are looking for in such a story? 
Whence this obsession with ideas, if the goal is to exhibit something of the beauty of grace? 
This problem cannot be solved by claiming that the genealogy written by the academic 
                                                
38 See for example Peter M. Candler, Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction, or Reading Scripture 
Together on the Path to God (Grand Rapids, Mich: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2006). 
39 There is much that could be said against this reading. See for example John W. Burbidge, 
Hegel’s Systematic Contingency (Basingstoke, UK ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
40 Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1992), 277–95. In an implicit reference to Rose, Milbank refuses a position that stops at  
’middles forever “broken”in time’. However, that is not necessarily the implication of Rose’s 
work. Žižek, Milbank, and Davis, The Monstrosity of Christ, 117. 
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theologian is a different enterprise than the story of this other City—for it is only as an account 
of moments of grace that genealogy receives its theological justification.  
This suggests that there is a union of reflection, praxis and transformation involved in a 
phenomenology not sufficiently taken into account by theological genealogies, which always 
threaten to fall into a fixation with ideas. Put differently, if the analogical vision defended by 
the genealogies of O’Regan and Milbank hinges on a rejection of a univocity which puts a 
wedge between the theoretical and the practical, then there is no inherent reason to think that a 
recovery of the details of Eckhart’s theology will sow the seeds of transformation any more 
than a sustained reflection on a theatrical play, the experience of suffering, or indeed the 
prayerful meditation on the Via Dolorosa on Good Friday. A strong emphasis on the analogical 
must lead to an integration of the anagogical, the act of ‘leading above’. Indeed, if there is no 
univocity between God and the world, semantic content can never be stabilised, multiplied to 
infinity and projected on God—the good can only be learned on a spiritual journey where the 
increase and transformation of wisdom are inseparable from practice. What matters is the 
moments of decision on the way: which path we choose to follow and how we learn from 
failure. These moments, transitions from one path to another, are moments of learning, where 
we must be attentive to the shift in context, that surplus or increase which cannot be accounted 
for by the finite text. A finite life in the middle does not result in the analogy of concepts, but 
the analogy of remembrance, that is, a remembrance which itself happens in the middle voice. 
Such stories of learning are too often forgotten by those engaged in the genealogical. 
This is all to say that Hegelian phenomenology is a spiritual and pedagogical exercise in a way 
that Foucauldian genealogy is not, even when the latter is baptised by theologians. Although 
the genealogical is intertwined with a sort of spiritual practice in the Foucauldian tradition, for 
Foucault the genealogical allows for a sort of release from the arbitrary limits set by discursive 
traditions and practices. Its transformative moment is primarily negative. Although theological 
genealogies are also written with a positive vision in mind, this positive element is not allowed 
to transform the rhetorical and pedagogical practice itself. In a phenomenology there is an 
entanglement of history and reality, reader and text, agent, memory and event which is lost in 
the genealogical since the form of phenomenology more clearly involves a moment of 
investment. This loss of this moment, I suggest, may have detrimental effects on theological 
practice.  
 
LEST WE FORGET: A CONCLUSION 
In a recent review article of O’Regan’s book, Aaron Riches and Sebastián Montiel lauds the 
former for dispelling the Hegelian ghost haunting modernity.41 Repeating O’Regan’s critique, 
and echoing the work of William Desmond,42 they fear that Hegel’s Spirit is a ‘counterfeit’ 
double of the Holy Ghost. Hegel is the character that seductively calls for Erinnerung, catching 
the theologian, the church, yes—modernity itself!—into his speculative net. Here, in the 
spectre of Hegel, hide also the ghosts of Neoplatonism and Gnosticism. Hegel’s philosophy 
thus overtakes theology and reconfigures Christian dogma for his own speculative use, dressing 
up heterodoxy in the most magnificent Christian garments. The crux of Hegel’s equivocation 
                                                
41 Aaaron Riches and Sebastián Montiel, “On Re-Membering Geist: Hegelian Hauntotheology 
and O’Regan’s Anatomy of Misremembering,” Modern Theology 32, no. 2 (2016): 268–78. 
42 William Desmond, Hegel’s God: A Counterfeit Double?, Ashgate Studies in the History of 
Philosophical Theology (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003). 
 18 
can perhaps be formulated in the ambiguous transition from religion to philosophy in his work: 
Christian religion shows itself as the absolute and true religion precisely in the moment its 
Logos is exhausted in the clarity of the philosophical logos.  
Although this might all be true on some level, it seems to me that the real value of Hegel is 
precisely this importance of duplicity. The duplicity, that is, of holding two things in mind at 
once. If we manage to do so, perhaps we might see that there is more than one way of engaging 
with his thought. For another lesson of Hegel is that an unequivocal Nein! always sooner or 
later betray its implicit—and therefore uncomprehended—relation to that which is refused. 
Mediation is possible, as when Graham Ward argues that Hegel is the one who shows how the 
incarnation made a real difference to how we reason, or when D. C. Schindler analyses the 
complexities of Hegel’s notion of freedom.43 
I touch on these somewhat parochial debates about the relevance of Hegel because the attempt 
to out-narrate Hegel is yet another example of what happens when the nature of genealogical 
discourse is not critically evaluated. Theologians should be careful with the practice of taking 
leave of someone, and ghosts only appear when the wounds of the past remain unresolved. 
This attempt to decisively expel Hegel and treat him as no ‘friend’ of theology, reveals the 
inherently ahistorical tendency of many genealogies and shows that, paradoxically, a 
phenomenology can be more, not less truly historical than historicist genealogies.44 Whereas 
Hegel is often read as understanding history as teleologically leading up to his own time, 
genealogies can fall into a similar trap, one that might even be worse: tracing genealogically 
the ideas to be vindicated can lead to a ciphering of history where actors are either good or bad 
depending on the extent to which they agree with the author’s position. This has again to do 
with the fact that the ontological vision, which is charged with a kind of necessity, is not 
properly implicated in the historical and contingent experience of learning, of trying and 
failing, but only stands in an expressive relationship vis-à-vis history. In this way, a genealogy 
can easily become a triumphant story about those who happened to grasp this truth rightly. 
When this is done, one can begin deciding between the authentic and the deceitful, the friend 
and enemy, and thereby purge the ‘real’ Christian tradition from its mistakes, that is, from its 
process of learning. Such a story does not do justice to the development of Christian language, 
of political and social experience, and ultimately distorts the nature of grace as it appears in 
history.  
Lest we forget, we should treat our historical and intellectual predecessors with care. Hegel is 
not one who must be saved from oblivion or unjust treatment, but he might remind us of some 
of the ways in which we misremember. Remembering is a spiritual exercise involving 
investment, dispossession and unexpected reception. The issues that arose in my analysis of 
some theological critiques of modern culture and thought shows that we have not yet overcome 
our spiritual forgetfulness. For theologians this is a call to think the third, to once again consider 
the relationship between genealogy and phenomenology, narrative and dialectics, mythos and 
logos. Furthermore, if Christian theologians are ultimately dealing with a body once mangled 
to the point of being beyond the powers of human remedy, we must be careful with how quickly 
we dress the wounds of our tradition and re-member our collective and historical bodies. In 
                                                
43 Graham Ward, “How Hegel Became a Philosopher: Logos and the Economy of Logic,” 
Critical Research on Religion 1, no. 3 (2013): 270–92; D. C. Schindler, The Perfection of 
Freedom: Schiller, Schelling and Hegel between the Ancients and the Moderns, Veritas 8 
(Eurene, Or: Cascade Books, 2012). 
44 Riches and Montiel, “On Re-Membering Geist: Hegelian Hauntotheology and O’Regan’s 
Anatomy of Misremembering,” 278. 
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theological writing and practice, our response cannot simply be to ‘tell the story otherwise’. 
Instead, we must attend to how such stories can be lived and enacted, how they are partial, and 
that something is always lost along the way. Only thus might we see that there is yet much to 
learn.45 
	
                                                
45 In addition to the two anonymous reviewers, I would like to thank the following for very 
helpful comments and suggestions: Christian Coppa; Stefan Fisher-Høyrem; Ruth Jackson; 
Nathan Lyons; Nandan M. Ratnam; Catherine Pickstock; Simon Ravenscroft; and Rowan 
Williams. 
